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CHANGE IN THE EXCHANGES: 
AN ANALYSIS OF LONDON'S 




Commodity exchanges are waking up to 
worldwide competition. As in any other indus-
try, exchanges which manage the trading of 
commodities are contending against each other 
to lure business to their establishments. Fueled 
by their ambitions or dragged through the 
changes by the agencies controlling them, 
world marketplaces are changing. New tech-
nology, shifts in the commodities' supply and 
demand, arbitrage potential from additional 
contracts, and new financial applications of 
commodity trading are just some of the factors 
that exchanges have to address. The number of 
issues makes it difficult to always be right and 
therefore sustain a preferred exchange among 
international traders. 
This international competition in the 
commodities markets has become fierce, as is 
demonstrated by many recent changes. Ex-
changes are adding new instruments, extend-
ing trading times, and creating new link-ups 
with other exchanges at a pace never before 
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seen. Commodity markets are not only becom-
ing more international, but are becoming in-
creasingly subject to rapid innovation. While 
London has been known throughout history as 
the principal place to trade commodities on an 
international basis, similar United States and 
Asian markets have created a recent surge of 
competition for market share. Problems such 
as the "tin debacle" also have awakened Lon-
don to the need for changes. In response, Lon-
don exchanges are reorganizing their markets 
to send a message that they will fight to retain 
their title as the commodity trading capital of 
the world ("Defending ... ," p. 75). 
The overall intent of this paper is to deter-
mine London's effectiveness in competing with 
international commodity exchanges. Focusing 
on metals markets instead of soft commodities 
such as coffee and sugar, it will examine fu-
tures1 markets as well as spot and physical 
1 A futures contract is a contract to make or take delivery of 
a commodity at some future date. 
markets2• Specifically, it will analyze the ac-
tions of London and of other exchanges in the 
futures metals markets and the effectiveness of 
sound policies and the various modem "gim-
micks" which have been used to attract cus-
tomers. But first, the paper will address the 
need for and purposes of world commodity 
markets. An evaluation of how exchanges fulfill 
this need for marketplaces will then be made. 
Commodity Futures Exchanges-
Evaluation Criteria 
The concept underlying a futures ex-
change is an old one. Determining a price now 
for a future action has continued in one form or 
another for centuries. However, the use of ex-
changes to carry out this practice is relatively 
modem. The purpose of an exchange is to pro-
vide a central forum where continuous and 
consistent evaluation of supply and demand 
dictates a price for a commodity. The forum 
provides a means by which buyers and sellers 
can exchange contracts for commodities through 
representatives. 
Liquidity is a vital component of an ex-
change, as demonstrated by the difference be-
tween futures and forward contracts. Futures 
contracts are always traded on an organized 
exchange and are standardized in format. In 
addition, the use of a clearing house3 and the 
requirement of daily resettlement4 are new de-
velopments at most modem futures markets 
(Kolb, pp. 3-9). While the exchange provides a 
forum to trade, its standardized contracts (in 
quality, quantity, delivery, and pricing aspects) 
allow each participant to know both what is for 
sale and what the terms are of that sale. These 
factors promote liquidity-a very important 
2 Although different, these two types of markets are charac-
terized primarily by having the contract executed within a 
very short time frame. Spot trading is trading done in the 
current month. Physical trading is trading for the actual 
delivery of the commodity. 
3 A clearing house is a third party to all transactions which 
stands as a safeguard between buyers and sellers on an 
exchange. 
4 Resettlement is a safeguard where traders are required to 
realize any losses in cash or Treasury Bills on the day 
they occur. 
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advantage of trading on an exchange instead of 
writing a specific contract (forward contract-
ing). Through abundant market activity, li-
quidity ensures that the difference between bid 
and offer prices is minimal. Therefore, a fair 
market price for each contract is more likely. 
Forward contracts may not be transferable at 
the market price. Instead, they may require a 
discount because of the contracts' highly spe-
cialized nature. As an exception to this general 
rule, foreign exchange is traded both on a for-
ward basis, through a network, and on a futures 
exchange. Used primarily by commercial banks, 
the network is not a physical location. It is a 
series of trading desks connected by modem 
communications technology. Despite the pres-
ence of a futures market, the forward market 
has met with great success in maintaining 
liquidity at its marketplace. 
There are many ways to evaluate a futures 
exchange. Factors such as liquidity, transac-
tion costs, transparency (being able to easily 
determine the current price, the buyers, and 
the sellers), and financial security against de-
fault by the party taking the opposite side of the 
trade are of the utmost importance to par-
ticipants in these markets. International trad-
ing requires that many other factors must also 
be addressed. Exchange rate stability, the cur-
rency of exchange (the currency in which the 
price is traded and quoted), and unrestricted 
export and import of the commodity are essen-
tial in selecting an exchange through which 
to trade. 
Each exchange is different. Each has dif-
ferent rules, regulators, and participants that 
make it unique. Therefore, acclimation to an 
exchange can be an important requisite to 
traders. The traders' reaction to factors sur-
rounding the tin crisis in London provides a 
good example of over-reliance on one exchange. 
The tin crisis was a foreseeable and imminent 
massive default by the International Tin Coun-
cil (lTC). Despite this, the traders stayed at the 
Exchange. When the marketplace was finally 
forced to close, traders from the London Metal 
Exchange (LME) decided to trade without the 
use of the Exchange or to curtail considerably 
the volume once traded on the LME. Some, 
however, did go to new exchanges due to the 
need to trade on an exchange and their realiza-
tion of the LME's financial insecurity at the 
time. As mentioned above, the clearing house 
and daily resettlement are now used to ensure 
that defaults on trades never evolve into events 
such as those of the tin crisis. 
Some exchanges have now become profit-
making companies. On the negative side, it is 
uncertain if traders will accept a profit-making 
exchange. The question of who will share in 
the profits is also unknown. However, an ex-
change provides more financial security and 
has more "clout" by having an independent 
source of funds. Otherwise, it would have to 
rely on members or regulating bodies should 
more funds be needed. How to evaluate ex-
changes on this factor remains to be seen. 
London Exchanges 
Converting a Distribution Center into 
a Global Marketplace 
The roots of commodity markets trace 
back to ancient civilizations. Although not the 
earliest indication of futures trading, wheat 
forward contracts have been dated back to ap-
proximately 1000 B.C. (Gould, p. 53). The de-
velopment of local commodity exchanges and 
of futures contracts in Japanese and Western 
markets during the mid-1800s is fairly well 
documented. In these and other areas, both re-
gional and international commodity exchanges 
grew as demand increased. London assumed 
the role of commodity trading capital of the 
world because of England's world empire and 
its proximity to the European market's demand. 
By itself, the supply of England's South Mrican 
gold was sufficient to install London as a pow-
erful marketplace. 
Mter World War I, South Mrica desired to 
have someone marketing its gold to buyers 
instead of relying on the set prices from the 
Bank of England. It choseN. M. Rothschild & 
Sons Ltd. because of Rothschild's banking 
background and financial resources. Since 
September 12, 1919, in the Rothschild offices, 
the London gold "fix" has been conducted by 
the same five brokerage houses5• The fix is a 
5 The five houses at the fix are as follows: Mocatta & Goldsmid; 
Sharps, Pixley; Rothschild & Sons; Johnson Matthey; 
Samuel Montagu. 
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unique marketplace in which the supply and 
demand of these five houses and their cus-
tomers are matched. Also, prices on other ex-
changes are considered to establish this settle-
ment price. The volume traded at the fix is not 
made public, but the fix is an attractive market 
where large amounts of gold can be traded in 
one place and at one price. It is a gauge of the 
very volatile gold markets, and many business 
valuations use the fix prices. 
Prior to 1968, South Africa used the Lon-
don markets exclusively to market its gold (and 
other metals) production. With South Mrica 
producing up to three-fourths of the Western 
world's gold, the market servicing this bonanza 
would obviously be a central trading forum. 
The Soviet Union, a leading producer of gold, 
also sold nearly all of its gold through London 
prior to 1968. Until this time, the London mar-
ket was based on the buying and selling of 
physical gold, as opposed to speculative trad-
ing. London was basically a distribution center 
for South Mrican gold. 
The events leading to the changes in 1968 
are numerous. To begin with, the international 
gold pool- comprised of the United States, 
Britain, Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, and West Germany-tried to 
keep the price of gold fixed at $35 an ounce 
under the Bretton Woods System. They joined 
together in 1961 to use their gold reserves to 
counter market forces. Then, in 1966 buying 
pressure pushed the price of gold against the 
$35/ ounce limit. Furthermore, the combina-
tion of the deteriorating United States balance 
of payments, the weakness of Russian gold 
sales, and the eagerness of buyers around the 
world all forced this pool to sell nearly 1000 
tons of gold in one week in order to keep the 
$35/ ounce price. Mter that week, on March 15, 
1968, Britain announced that the gold market 
would be closed for two weeks. 
The reopening of the London gold market 
resulted in a two-tier system of prices under the 
Washington Agreement, which was to last for 
seven years. Under the agreement, there re-
mained a fixed $35/ ounce price at which cen-
tral banks had to trade. In addition, there was a 
new free market in which market forces dic-
tated the gold price. The central banks were 
prohibited from trading their reserves on the 
free market. Also, after the two week close, Lon-
don saw the physical market, which it had 
dominated for three centuries, shift to Swit-
zerland (the largest buyer in London for anum-
ber of years). The three major banks of Switzer-
land6 persuaded South Mrica to trade directly 
with them instead of going indirectly through 
London. When the Soviet Union, which had 
curbed gold exports in 1966, began to export 
actively again in 1972, it chose to go through 
the Wozchod Handelsbank in Zurich. Pre-
viously, the Soviet Union had used a bank in 
London, Moscow Narodney Bank. The London 
gold fix also changed after this two week period. 
It now quoted prices in dollars; and in addition 
to its morning fix, it added an afternoon fix to 
attract more United States business. Due to 
time zone differences and communications ad-
vances, the second fix enabled the opening of 
the American market to influence the price 
determination. London had been challenged to 
become a global marketplace. If it had failed to 
act, London would have seen any and all roles 
in dominating exchanges vanish after Swit-
zerland took the gold distribution role. 
London's Competitors 
New York's Commodity Exchange, Inc. 
(COMEX) provides an appropriate contrast to 
the LME in highlighting market security fac-
tors. Currently, the LME trades contracts of 
aluminum, lead, zinc, nickel, silver, and cop-
per. Its participants are primarily industry-based 
traders who trade to hedge7 and/or to take 
delivery of the actual commodity. The COM EX, 
however, does a significant amount of specula-
tive trading. Much of this speculative trading is 
done by traders known as locals, who trade for 
their own account instead of for that of a cus-
tomer. Locals, encouraged to participate on the 
COM EX, have never been allowed on the LME. 
Trades by locals give them a position in the 
6 There are three major banks of Switzerland: Swiss Bank 
Corporation; Swiss Credit Bank; Union Bank of Switzerland. 
7 A hedge trade takes on a position in order to eliminate 
some or all risk. This is usually because there is another 
commitment exactly opposite to that of the hedged trade. 
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market, through which they hope to make a 
profit. A reversing trade is then made to eli min-
ate the original trade's obligation. Since these 
trades add to the exchange's volume, they pro-
vide liquidity to the market. 
Also, in relation to its international coun-
terparts, the LME has a reputation for being 
staunchly conservative and very intolerant of 
changes in its traditions. By following Lon-
don's traditions, the traders eliminated the 
need to record every trading rule. This reliance 
on tradition instead of on rules is demonstrated 
by the difference in the sizes of the contracts of 
the LME and the COMEX. In the mid-1980s, 
the LME's rules could fit on every LME con-
tract (one sheet of paper) while the ten-pound 
COM EX bylaws weighed more than some of the 
metals which the contracts represented. 
Prior to 1987, trades at the LME were 
made without a clearing house and on a princi-
pal-to-principal basis (Salak, "LME Changes ... ", 
p. 1). This meant that each contract traded 
specifically matched the buyer and seller on 
each side of the trade. This was unlike the case 
at COM EX where the trades filter through the 
clearing house, which becomes the opposite 
party to every contract The LME's principal-
to-principal method led to devastating losses 
after the default by the International Tin Coun-
cil (lTC). 
The Tin Crisis 
All of the evaluation criteria mentioned so 
far can be used to appraise any exchange. How-
ever, some situations arise to which only one 
exchange can react. The LME's reaction to the 
tin crisis caused by the lTC is such a situation. 
The lTC was a cartel that kept the price of 
tin artificially high. To do this, it bought tin 
when the price started to fall. Its purchase of 
tin, however, created a demand in the market 
which did not represent the actual demand of 
tin for customary use. The cartel had to con-
tinually buy tin to keep the price high, which 
caused its tin inventories to skyrocket. In the 
fall of 1986, the lTC succumbed to market forces 
and defaulted on a large number of contracts 
which it had purchased. The trading price of tin 
fell sharply the moment the lTC stopped its 
support, making losses unrecoverable. This 
happened because selling its tin inventories 
would have caused the price to fall even lower. 
Therefore, in an unprecedented action, the 
ITC's twenty-two nations (including all of the 
European Economic Community countries and 
Japan) refused to pay for contracts they had 
purchased on margin. Losses to the other prin-
cipals to the trades might have been avoided if 
the LME had used an independent clearing 
house, as United States exchanges do.lt was on 
October 25, 1986 that the lTC default resulted 
in the indefinite suspension of LME tin trad-
ing. It came during a period in which the LME 
was losing its market share to more innovative 
exchanges such as the COMEX. 
Clearing trades through a clearing house 
instead of on a principal-to-principal basis was 
discussed as a possible change by the LME. 
However, neither this nor other improvements 
were implemented. Before the tin crisis, liquid-
ity concerns were also mentioned by the chair-
man of the LME as a potential problem if changes 
were not made to attract more participation. 
With declining participation, the spread be-
tween the prices at which people are willing to 
buy or sell increases because of less competi-
tion among the traders. This discrepancy be-
tween the bid and offer prices reduces the at-
tractiveness of an exchange because outside 
participants usually incur the cost of the 
spread. 
Another hindrance to the LME is that 
trading, done by an open-outcry method in 
trading rings (or pits), is only for five minutes. 
Prices at which to buy or sell are expressed ver-
bally or by hand signals to the rest of the mem-
bers. Mter the LME's five-minute rings close, 
phone calls and a more clandestine trading 
method (trading on the kerb) is used to set the 
prices. By trading on the kerb (the term is 
derived from traders who left the Exchange and 
traded outside on the curb after being forced to 
limit trading to five minutes), the liquidity and 
the transparency of the commodity prices are 
limited. The transparency is limited because 
without the open-outcry method of trading, as 
goes on in the five-minute rings, buyers and 
sellers and their bid and offer prices are not 
easily determined. The absence of locals also 
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limits liquidity. Without locals there is a reli-
ance on the business provided from brokerage 
houses and their clients, neither of which are 
inclined to take positions for pure speculation. 
Another significant concern highlighted 
by the tin debacle is that the principal-to-
principal method of trading created a club-like 
atmosphere. This resulted from the individual 
nature of the contracts and members' reliance 
on the other principal to the trade. This reliance 
evolved from continually trading with the same 
traders and relying on their backing by a brok-
erage house. However, it was the club-like at-
mosphere of the London exchanges, such as 
the LME, that softened the blow of the tin 
debacle because of the strong bond between 
the participants. The members of the LME were 
likely to stand behind each other and continue 
to honor the contracts they could. In the face of 
great uncertainty, the COMEX's speculators, 
who may not have been backed by a brokerage 
house, would have likely stopped trading alto-
gether. However, London's comradery was still 
not enough to keep participants from seeking 
other alternatives to the exchange. 
It may also be said that, because the LME 
is a trade-oriented exchange, the panic that 
might have ensued in the other areas of the 
LME was less devastating. In contrast, specu-
lating locals do not have a continued need to 
trade in the face of great uncertainty. Also, a 
lack of strong controls on margins required 
among traders allowed purchases to be made 
on margins as low as one percent (five times 
lower than that common for a futures position 
for a lo\\' volatility day on the COMEX). These 
two facts, in a club-like atmosphere, were ob-
vious contributors to the extent of the disaster. 
The tin crisis pointed out the need for a clear-
ing corporation to guarantee trades between 
principals and an increase in liquidity. Other-
wise, the LME would continue to lose out to 
other more secure and liquid markets such as 
New York and Chicago. 
After the Tin Crisis 
The competition among international ex-
changes is not waning. There are still con-
tinuous contract proposals by exchanges, ex-
change mergers, extended hours, new rules, 
new authorities, communication enhance-
ments, etc. Following the changes is almost as 
hectic as trading on one of the exchange 
floors. 
As a result of the default, the LME lost up 
to 50 percent of its other trading volume. The 
tin market never reopened, which forced buyers 
to go directly to suppliers and haggle prices. On 
the positive side, the LME started a clearing 
house which requires margins to be met by all 
traders. This restored a great deal of confidence 
in the Exchange and created actual market 
security as opposed to confidence through 
"tradition." It also forced the LME to change 
and accept the market requirements of the 
late 1980s. 
Other pressure resulted from the backlash 
of the"Big Bang" in which the United King-
dom's trading regulator, the Security and In-
vestment Board, called for changes in the regu-
lation of the LME. The LME was now required 
to be recognized as one of the United Kingdom's 
new "recognized investment exchanges." In 
order to do this, the self-regulating LME was 
pressured to impose certain rules upon itself to 
convince the administration that in the future 
the LME would protect all parties involved 
in a trade. 
The LME is not the only exchange in the 
United Kingdom that needs to change in order 
to compete effectively. However, the LME is 
the only exchange that has stubbornly refused 
to take the necessary steps without being 
pushed. One London exchange that reacted to 
falling market share and initiated changes was 
the London Commodity Exchange (LCE). Deal-
ing in "soft" commodities such as sugar, coffee, 
and cocoa, the Exchange admitted locals and 
expanded trading with options. The LCE even 
changed its name to one which was more mar-
ketable to investors- the London Futures and 
Options Exchange or London FOX, for short. 
Currently, London has five commodity 
exchanges. Already mentioned were the LME 
and London FOX. London's energy futures 
exchange, the International Petroleum Ex-
change, has shared the same trading floor with 
the London FOX since 1987. An exchange which 
started in 1987 as a combination of the agricul-
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tural and freight exchanges is the Baltic Fu-
tures Exchange. Finally, in terms of volume 
traded the London International Financial Fu-
tures Exchange is London's largest commodity 
exchange. It started operations in 1982. How-
ever, the Exchange is really more of a financial 
futures market than,q.pure commodity exchange. 
The Competition 
United States Futures Exchanges 
The COMEX in New York and the exchanges 
in Chicago have been the main beneficiaries of 
London's loss of market share. The use of the 
exchanges in the United States is a great deal 
different from that in the United Kingdom. 
Both the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CITC) and the exchanges' self-regu-
lating committees set stringent rules. However, 
as long as an economic purpose is served, the 
U.S. markets are very open to speculative trad-
ing. These more speculative arenas require more 
rules. When the CITC started to control the 
U.S. exchanges, the London markets thought 
that the greater controls would drive much of 
the business to London because of its less 
regulated trading. However, in the very volatile 
markets of commodities, investors in fact looked 
for safety, preferring to take their risks in the 
price of the commodity instead of in the finan-
cial stability of the counterparty to the trade. 
London has thus lost a significant amount of 
business to the more regulated, and therefore 
more secure, exchanges of the United States. 
Trading on the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change (CME), the Chicago Board of Trade, and 
the COMEX is done by an ali-day open-outcry 
method. This system does not allow a club-like 
atmosphere to continue, since everyone trad-
ing is in a virtual free-for-all to get the best 
possible price. The price in this type of ali-day 
trading is very transparent and accommodates 
arbitrage between that exchange and other 
exchanges. 
Locals take part in New York and Chicago 
and provide needed liquidity to the markets. 
The liquidity ensures that the prices on the 
exchange move up or down with the increasing 
demands or supplies, respectively. It also en-
sures that the prices are not "sticky" with re-
spect to time. Without the locals, a single buyer 
in a market full of sellers could wait to buy until 
the price was very low. In a very liquid market, 
there is more competition from others in the 
market who are also speculating about future 
price estimates. This eliminates large jumps in 
price movements. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the 
markets for commodities, especially those for 
precious metals, were extremely active. This 
seemed to whet the appetite of traders for active 
markets in which big profits were available 
even on a moderate day of trading. This resulted 
because of the continuous flow of commis-
sions from trades, whether the trades made 
money or not. When the markets began to set-
tle down and the equity markets began to boom, 
commodity exchanges and traders found it 
hard to cope with the shrinking number of 
trades by speculative investors. Attracting specu-
lative investors and traders to the industry thus 
became very important. As mentioned above, 
the tin fiasco in London made it more appeal-
ing to trade through an exchange with tighter 
controls on margins and safer policies such as 
daily resettlement. The COMEX was a primary 
beneficiary and, with its open-outcry method 
of trading, was able to attract even more clients 
by offering options on its metals. However, the 
LME and LCE remained fastened to their old 
traditions for as long as possible until forced to 
change because of declining participation and 
the Financial Services Act. 
Recent investigations of the Chicago and 
New York commodities exchanges have focused 
on members' violations of rules as opposed to 
inadequate rules. Despite this, the exchanges 
are considering placing more restrictions on 
such practices as dual trading. Dual trading is 
the ability of a trader to trade for both his own 
account and a customer's account, and can 
lead to a conflict of interest. Abuses of this 
privilege are one of the main points addressed 
in the investigations. The CME has already 
limited dual trading in the Standard and Poor's 
500 Index futures pit,· and additional limits on 
this practice are being seriously considered. 
The use of confidential information seems a 
more prevalent problem, and one which is much 
harder to detect. This happens because traders 
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are in a face-to-face situation and have con-
tinuous dealings with each other. Knowledge )_ 
of another broker's impending trade obviously 
can give an unfair advantage to a trader. However, 
monitoring all the information passed in the 
pits would be a cumbersome task and certainly 
an uneconomical one. The use of trades to 
manipulate prices for immediate gain or for tax 
evasion is also under investigation. The U.S. 
exchanges seem to be past the need for more 
rules and are appropriately confronting the 
enforcement issues. They are reacting both to 
maintain confidence and, more importantly, to 
install security against future violations. 
New York Markets 
The COMEX has not been without its 
problems in the recent past. Both the Hunt 
brothers' failure to adequately cover margin 
requirements in 1979-80 and the default by 
Volume Investors Corp. in March of 1985 were 
major embarrassments to the Exchange. How-
ever, the COMEX Clearing Association's role 
prevented a shutdown of the market, as occurred 
in the LME. In addition, the Exchange took 
steps in each situation to preventsimilarfuture 
occurrences. 
Traded on the COMEX are a variety of 
commodities and other financial instruments. 
Gold, silver, and copper are very stong markets. 
Options on these metals as well as a corporate 
bond index are among the intruments now 
available to investors. It is important to con-
sider that the exchanges must prove to the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission that 
a proposed contract has a sound economic 
reason behind it. Usually this reason is to reduce 
the risk for participants who hedge their pro-
duction/ consumption in the futures market. 
On the same floor in New York City's World 
Trade Center is the New York Mercantile Ex-
change (NYMEX) which trades heating oils, 
platinum, and palladium along with some other 
"soft" commodities. The COMEX and the 
NYMEX represent strong futures markets. The 
COMEX, in fact, is the world's largest futures 
market for gold. The Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa 
Exchange is also located on this trading floor. 
The COMEX's reaction to greater com-
petition was less drastic than that of some of 
the other exchanges, mainly because the 
COM EX was already in a good position to gain 
market share. Its reaction was to expand the 
instruments traded to include, as mentioned, 
copper and also aluminum. Options were the 
next step, and after some failures options even-
tually became established with a fairly steady 
volume of trading. One of the unique steps 
taken by COMEX was to create a link-up with 
the Sydney Futures Exchange. This link-up 
enables gold trades made in one exchange to be 
offset in the other. The new venture lengthens 
the trading time and removes the necessity to 
deliver the trades between exchanges. The 
COMEX also is updating its clearing system. 
The new system will use computers to cross-
check the trades made on the trading floor, 
which should both speed up the process of 
locating trades with errors and eliminate a 
number of very hectic jobs. Finding trading 
errors very quickly is extremely important be-
cause of the volatility of the market. If an error 
is not detected before the market closes, it is 
then up to the two opposing brokers to work 
out a solution or the exchange will impose its 
own judgment. The decision is usually to divide 
the losses/ gains between the two floor brokers. 
One change on which the COM EX cannot 
make its decision alone isamergerofitselfwith 
the NYMEX. The result would be a very large 
New York exchange, one which would probably 
grow to include the Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa 
Exchange. Currently, all three of these ex-
changes share the same trading floor. Talks 
about a possible merger have been intermittent 
among these self-regulated bodies. However, 
due to NYMEX's strength from its oil markets, 
it has postponed the idea. 
Chicago and Electronic Trading 
Chicago has its fair share of markets, too, 
with the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) as the 
world's largest commodity exchange, followed 
by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). 
The CBOT has many varied soft commodities, 
and is the central trading place in the world for 
such commodities as pork bellies, orange juice, 
and com. Chicago also now trades gold and 
silver futures and is in competition with the 
COM EX for the U.S. market. Various marketing 
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methods are used to distinguish between con-
tracts. Different delivery months or contract 
sizes are some of the common methods used. 
For example, Chicago's silver market competes 
with COM EX silver, but they trade for different 
delivery months and for different contract sizes. 
Although not as popular as COM EX silver, the 
Chicago market has been able to maintain suf-
ficient participation to keep the market open. 
In 1986, Chicago introduced a 100 troy-ounce 
gold contract to compete with the COMEX's 
similar contract. In addition, the CME has set 
up a link between itself and the Singapore 
International Monetary Exchange with options 
on Eurodollar, yen and deutsche mark futures 
as offsettable contracts. Chicago has extended 
its coverage by adding new instruments and 
trading options on its commodities. The Chicago 
Board of Options Exchange deals with the 
options on many commodities and financial 
instruments. These markets are all run with an 
open-outcry method and usually allow locals 
to trade. Extending the time of trading in Chicago 
has also been implemented on some contracts 
and is proposed for still others because of the 
possibility of overlapping Tokyo's trading time. 
The most significant change to face the 
industry is the advent of electronic trading. 
The CME is leading the way by introducing 
with Reuters Holdings PLC a for-profit trading 
system named "Globex." The CME has already 
signed the NYMEX, the Sydney Futures Ex-
change, and Paris's futures exchange to par-
ticipate in Globex. This alternative to the open-
outcry method was first met with wariness and 
rejection. Being self-regulated, the exchanges 
are obviously influenced by traders who are 
members or who work for members of the ex-
change. Electronic trading is a major threat to 
the open-outcry method of trading and, there-
fore, a threat to the traders who do that trading. 
Despite this, the CME has shown commitment 
to the $40 million software to be implemented 
in October, 1989 during times when the trad-
ing pits are closed. Electronic trading uses a 
computer to match orders placed through li-
censed terminals instead of through screaming 
brokers. The system provides a complete audit 
trail and cannot fill an order without an exact 
opposite order. This eliminates many of the 
common trading errors with brokers. 
The CBOT introduced its own electronic 
trading system, "Aurora," only after the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission approved 
the Globex system. Prior to this the CBOT 
fought Globex, contending it would lead to 
illegal pre-arranged trades. Aurora simulates 
the actual trading floor on a screen with buyers 
and sellers shown by circles and squares. Each 
figure will have an identification revealing who 
is making the offer. This makes Aurora more 
transparent than Globex, which keeps the buy-
ers and sellers confidential. This new method is 
sure to create greater competition for markets 
and, if it catches on, will rival every exchange 
no matter what the time zone. 
Other Competition 
Although the U.S. and U.K. markets cur-
rently dominate commodity trading, it is im-
portant to investigate other markets to under-
stand the future competition. As the govern-
ment of Japan slowly opens its doors to let its 
financial firms have greater freedom in trading 
worldwide, it is also allowing foreign firms to 
participate at its exchanges. Currently, these 
changes are progressing only in the financial 
instruments area. However, it will not be long 
before Japan realizes that attracting foreign 
participation to its exchanges will benefit its 
economy. 
Hong Kong has combined the gold, soy-
bean, and sugar futures from the now defunct 
Hong Kong Commodities Exchange into the 
Hong Kong Futures Exchange (HKFE). The 
HKFE is now the largest market for stock index 
futures outside of the United States. The hope 
of commodity traders is that its success will 
spill into the commodities markets. There is, 
however, some strong competition from other 
exchanges in this time zone. 
The Sydney Futures Exchange is facing a 
liquidity problem because it is not attracting 
investments from within Australia. As shown 
by its participation with the COMEX link-up 
and CME's Globex, it is trying to overcome this. 
The New Zealand Futures Exchange (NZFE), 
on the other hand, has been successful in at-
tracting United States investors. The result has 
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been a strong boost to this growing Exchange. 
The NZFE trades New Zealand wool and finan-
cial futures similar to 90-day bank acceptance 
bills. The Exchange expanded its hours in July, 
1988 and expects to expand them yet another 
two hours in the near future. There is even talk 
of its becoming a 24 hour market NZFE is unique 
in that it is fully automated. The Exchange 
uses screen trading- much like . that of the 
United States' over the counter stock market 
and those to be implemented in Chicago. The 
success or failure of this system and the Chicago 
systems will cause exchanges to reconsider a 
basic question of trading- the trading method. 
Other exchanges around the world have 
not been idly sitting back, either. Trading longer 
hours, creating link-ups between two exchanges 
(which, in almost all respects, makes for one 
international exchange), admitting locals to 
increase liquidity, and adding new trading in-
struments (such as new commodities, futures, 
or options) are just a few of the devices that 
exchanges are employing to attract the indus-
try traders and speculators. The exchanges are 
trying almost any tactic to increase their market 
shares or develop a new market. The outcome 
of these tactics ranges from great success to 
having to shut down the market from lack of 
activity. While some traders have called some 
of the new tactics "gimmicks," the increase in 
business is always appreciated. The exchange 
industry has become fierce and competitive 
with both governments and traders prompting 
the exchanges to increase their market share. A 
strong exchange is very likely to attract busi-
ness to floor brokers and to increase the taxable 
base for the hosting government (which also 
has the right to set trading standards). 
London Reacts 
If it had not been for the tin crisis and the 
"Big Bang" in the equity markets, it might 
have been even longer before the London com-
modity exchanges reacted to their decreasing 
market share. The London Commodity Ex-
changes's reaction was quick to abandon those 
practices that caused investors to leave. Now, 
the new London FOX competes on equal levels 
with such markets as New York, which had 
taken some of the sugar market from the Lon-
don FOX. The London FOX and the Inter-
national Petroleum Exchange (IPE) have au-
thorized twenty-five locals to purchase seats 
on the exchanges if they make certain commit-
ments to the markets. Changing its name, ad-
mitting locals, and moving into a building with 
the IPE all show that the London FOX means 
business and will take bold action to recapture 
lost markets. London FOX is taking the chance 
of becoming one of the few for-profit exchanges 
in the world. Trading there is now done on an 
open-outcry method, but the possibility of elec-
tronic trading is being explored. In fact, the 
chairman of the London FOX, Saxon Tate, be-
lieves it will only be a matter of time before 
trading is done completely by computer. He 
has determined that the London FOX will not 
be left behind in the race to capture market 
share. As Mr. Tate said, "We're looking to draw 
[lost volume] back from wherever and whatever'' 
(Cooper,p. 113). 
The LME has not been as quick as the 
London FOX to take action, but the actions 
finally taken by the LME are in the right direc-
tion. The LME's most recent change is that it 
now trades its silver and nickel contracts in 
U.S. dollars, a more international currency than 
the pound. It also quotes aluminum and zinc in 
dollars. Mter being one of the only exchanges 
without a clearing corporation, the LME finally 
established one in 1987. Having a clearing 
house to stand as a guarantee between traders 
is a necessity in today's world of very imagina-
tive financial scandals. Though it is nice to 
believe that the opposing broker will stand 
behind his trades, in fact this may not always be 
the case. The LME now also offers options on 
many of its commodities. However, it still has 
only six principal commodities. Changing the 
currency denomination of trading from pounds 
sterling to the more internationally accepted 
dollar is a realization of the U.S. market's 
strength. To have trading done in their own 
currency, which eliminates exchange-rate risk, 
is a great benefit to investors. It is not difficult 
to get a price quoted in dollars even if it is not 
traded in dollars (exchanges will do that for a 
customer), but payment must be made in the 
currency of trade and exchange-rate risk then 
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plays a factor. 
Necessary to the future success of the 
LME is the need to switch the method of trad-
ing from the five-minute rings to an ali-day 
open-outcry method. Another riskier, but pos-
sibly more rewarding, option is the implemen-
tation of an electronic trading system. As previ-
ously mentioned, there may be great resistance 
to this option fro D) brokers- a result of years of 
face-to-face trading in almost all of the ex-
changes and the brokers' fears of being replaced 
by such a system. 
Another important step desired for the 
LME by those observers outside of the Exchange 
is the admission of locals to increase liquidity. 
Although locals are welcome and play an im-
portant part in many exchanges, the LME is 
much less friendly to the idea of breaking up 
the club by admitting locals. The Exchange, 
although acknowledging the possibility of such 
a change, has not yet acted on this matter. 
While the precise reaction of investors 
cannot be known for sure, it is likely that they 
will look favorably on those changes that have 
been made in London's exchanges. One of the 
continued advantages of London is its central 
location in relation to time zones. However, it 
may lose even this advantage in the face oflink-
ups, extended trading hours, and electronic 
trading. In the short run, growth in London 
looks very possible. In the long run, though, a 
need to beat the other exchanges to new oppor-
tunities will determine its success in this rapidly 
moving industry. 
Conclusion 
Exchanges are in a period of expansion 
and intense competition. The ability of an ex-
change to compete will be measured by its 
ability to attract investors, whether trade-ori-
ented or speculative in nature. The rewards of 
such success will be increased activity result-
ing in more commissions for the brokers on 
the exchange. 
It should be clear from the above discus-
sion that unless an exchange competes for 
investors it will lose them. It is unlikely that 
the 111-year-old LME will go out of business. 
However, the reality of losing more of its market -
share to electronic systems unaffected by time 
zones and to more investor-oriented exchanges 
will confront it more forcefully every day. The 
ability to succeed is ultimately in the hands of 
the exchanges of London themselves. London 
must decide whether to react to world competi-
tion or to cleave to its desires to remain un-
changed. An electronic trading system such as 
those in Chicago is London's newest and po-
tentially most devastating competitor because 
of the computer's ability to compete in any 
marketplace. It will only be a short time before 
the LME realizes, as did the London FOX, that 
the need to meet not only local but inter-
national demands is paramount. Until then the 
LME will continue to lose business to the more 
internationally competitive markets. 
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